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In Brief
Rollwage et al. examined whether radical
beliefs are linked to alterations in
metacognition in a low-level perceptual
task. Radical participants—on both ends
of the political spectrum—showed
reduced insight into the correctness of
their choices and less sensitivity to post-
decision evidence, indicating a generic
resistance to revising mistakes.td.
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Widening polarization about political, religious, and
scientific issues threatens open societies, leading
to entrenchment of beliefs, reduced mutual under-
standing, and a pervasive negativity surrounding
the very idea of consensus [1, 2]. Such radicalization
has been linked to systematic differences in the cer-
tainty with which people adhere to particular beliefs
[3–6]. However, the drivers of unjustified certainty in
radicals are rarely considered from the perspective
of models of metacognition, and it remains unknown
whether radicals show alterations in confidence bias
(a tendency to publicly espouse higher confidence),
metacognitive sensitivity (insight into the correct-
ness of one’s beliefs), or both [7]. Within two inde-
pendent general population samples (n = 381 and
n = 417), here we show that individuals holding
radical beliefs (as measured by questionnaires about
political attitudes) display a specific impairment in
metacognitive sensitivity about low-level perceptual
discrimination judgments. Specifically, more radical
participants displayed less insight into the correct-
ness of their choices and reduced updating of their
confidence when presented with post-decision evi-
dence. Our use of a simple perceptual decision
task enables us to rule out effects of previous knowl-
edge, task performance, andmotivational factors un-
derpinning differences inmetacognition. Instead, our
findings highlight a generic resistance to recognizing
and revising incorrect beliefs as a potential driver of
radicalization.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
An unjustified certainty in one’s beliefs is a characteristic com-
mon to those espousing radical beliefs [3–6], and such over-
confidence is observed for both political and non-political
issues [3, 4, 6], implying a general cognitive bias in radicals.
However, the underpinnings of radicals’ distorted confidence
estimates remain unknown. In particular, one-shot measures
of the discrepancy between performance and confidence are
unable to disentangle the contributions of confidence bias4014 Current Biology 28, 4014–4021, December 17, 2018 ª 2018 Th
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creative(changes in an overall belief about performance, which may
be affected by optimism [8] and mood [9]) from changes in
metacognitive sensitivity (an ability to distinguish accurate
from inaccurate performance; [7]).
This distinction may be particularly important as changes in
metacognitive sensitivity may account for radicals’ reluctance
to change their mind in the face of new evidence. Decision
neuroscience has highlighted that metacognitive sensitivity de-
pends on mechanisms that facilitate monitoring and revision of
confidence in previous choices [10, 11]. This ability relies on spe-
cific neural circuitry in the prefrontal cortex [12] that promotes
reflection on one’s performance and, even in the absence of
explicit feedback, a realization that mistakes have been made
[13, 14]. It has generally been assumed that a resistance of
radicals to change their beliefs is due to social and motivational
factors, such as the desire to maintain a positive self-image
[15–18], whereas the role of metacognitive capacities has
received less attention. However, changes of mind depend not
only on a motivation to change but also on a (metacognitive)
capacity to realize that one’s beliefs are wrong.
By employing simple perceptual discrimination tasks, it is
possible to precisely quantify metacognitive sensitivity—the
extent to which people’s confidence judgments are sensitive to
task performance—and to disentangle metacognitive sensitivity
from overconfidence bias [7]. Such tasks provide an objectively
correct answer (which is rarely the case for direct assays of
political attitudes where the ground truth is often unknown or
unavailable), thus enabling a precise, quantitative, and objec-
tive measure of metacognitive ability as well as a normative
prediction for changes of confidence in light of new evidence.
Moreover, the usage of a perceptual task makes it unlikely that
participants have a priori vested interests in a particular decision
outcome, thus diminishing any strong link to participants’ self-
concept and providing an assay of the relationship between
domain-general metacognitive abilities and radicalism. Here,
we test a hypothesis that limitations in metacognitive sensitivity
lead to a resistance to belief change, even when motivational
factors are minimized, and that such metacognitive limitations
are associated with the entrenched beliefs that are exemplified
by radicals.
To typify a spectrum of radical views, we first conducted a
separate online survey of 344 US participants (study 1) who
completed questionnaires about political issues [4, 19–22].
We included standard questionnaires about political orienta-
tion, voting behavior, attitudes toward specific political issues,
intolerance of opposing political attitudes, belief rigidity, ande Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.
commons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Figure 1. The Left and Right Extremes of
the Political Spectrum Are Associated with
Intolerant and Dogmatic World Views
Data presented from study 1 (n = 344).
(A) Using factor analysis, we investigated the
underlying factor structure of multiple question-
naires about political issues. Three latent factors
were identified and labeled ‘‘political orientation,’’
‘‘dogmatic intolerance,’’ and ‘‘authoritarianism’’
according to the pattern of individual item load-
ings. Item loadings for each question (question-
naires indicated by different colors) are presented.
(B–D) To investigate the relation between these
constructs, scores on the three factors were
extracted for each individual. (B) We observed a
quadratic relationship between political orienta-
tion and dogmatic intolerance, revealing that
people on the extremes of the political spectrum
are more rigid and dogmatic in their world views.
(C) A linear relationship between political orienta-
tion and authoritarianism was observed, with
people from the far right of the political spectrum
showing more obedience to authorities and con-
ventions. (D) Dogmatic intolerance and authori-
tarianism were positively correlated, indicating
commonality between these two sub-components
of radicalism.
See also STAR Methods and Figure S1.(left- and right-wing) authoritarianism. These questionnaires
were selected based on prior models of political radicalism
as stemming from a combination of intolerance to others’
viewpoints, dogmatic and rigid beliefs, and authoritarianism,
which represents adherence to in-group authorities and con-
ventions, and aggression in relation to deviance from these
norms [23–25]. However, we stress that radicalism is likely to
reflect a general cognitive style that transcends the political
domain—as exemplified by links between religious funda-
mentalism and increased dogmatism and authoritarianism
[22, 26]—and instead refers to how one’s beliefs are held
and acted upon [27].
A factor analysis of individual items identified three latent
factors (Figure 1A; see STAR Methods for detailed informa-
tion about the factor loadings and their interpretation), which
we labeled ‘‘political orientation’’ (loading on leftward versus
rightward political views), ‘‘dogmatic intolerance’’ (loading on
questions related to intolerance to opposing political beliefs
and rigidity of belief system), and ‘‘authoritarianism’’ (loading
on questions related to obedience to authorities, adherence to
group conventions, and aggression against deviating behavior).
Together, these three factors explained 40% of the variance in
questionnaire responses. In what follows, we focus on the dog-Current Biologymatic intolerance and authoritarianism
factor scores as summary indices of radi-
calism [23–25].
Notably, a clear quadratic relationship
was evident between political orientation
and dogmatic intolerance (b = 0.37,
p < 1011), indicating that both the far
left and far right of the political spectrum
hold similarly intolerant and rigid beliefs,replicating previous findings [28]. On the other hand, a linear rela-
tionship of authoritarianism with political orientation was found
(b = 0.38, p < 1011), showing that those on the right of the polit-
ical spectrum displayed higher levels of authoritarianism, also
as reported previously [29]. Finally, dogmatic intolerance and
authoritarianismwere positively correlated (b = 0.21, p < 0.0001).
We next investigated whether metacognitive aspects of deci-
sion-making predict facets of radicalism. Subjects were asked to
carry out a series of perceptual discrimination tasks assaying
decision-making and metacognition (Figures 2A and 2B) before
filling out the same questionnaires administered in study 1. A first
experiment was conducted on a new sample of 381 US partici-
pants (study 2), and all key findings were replicated in an inde-
pendent sample of 417 US participants (study 3). Importantly,
we also replicated both the three-factor structure of question-
naire responses observed in study 1 and the pattern of interrela-
tions between factors (quadratic relationship between dogmatic
intolerance and political orientation, study 2: b = 0.42, p < 1016;
study 3: b = 0.40, p < 1015; linear relationship between author-
itarianism and political orientation, study 2: b = 0.32, p < 108;
study 3: b = 0.38, p < 1012; positive association between
authoritarianism and dogmatic intolerance, study 2: b = 0.22,
p < 104; study 3: b = 0.29, p < 107).28, 4014–4021, December 17, 2018 4015
Figure 2. Behavioral Tasks
(A) Confidence task (task 1): Participants were
asked to judge which of two patches contained a
greater number of flickering dots before rating their
confidence in each decision. Task difficulty was
determined by a fixed difference in dot number
between the patches andwas individually adjusted
in an initial calibration phase to target approxi-
mately 71% correct performance.
(B) Post-decision evidence integration task (task
2): Participants performed the same perceptual
decision as in part (A), but after each decision, they
were presented again with a new sample of flick-
ering dots before rating their confidence. In half of
trials, participants received the same evidence
strength post-decision as pre-decision, while in
the other half of trials, they received stronger post-
decision evidence (pre-adjusted to a strength that
led to 80% performance).
(C) Metacognitive sensitivity is defined as the
correspondence between task performance and
confidence ratings—the extent to which partici-
pants rate higher confidence when correct and
lower confidence when incorrect. Each graph
shows a hypothetical probability distribution over
confidence ratings for correct and incorrect trials,
with the overlap between distributions determining
metacognitive sensitivity. A small separation
between these distributions indicates low meta-
cognitive sensitivity (upper), while a large separa-
tion indicates highmetacognitive sensitivity (lower).
See also STAR Methods.In the confidence task (task 1), participants first completed a
series of perceptual discrimination judgments as to which of
two flickering patches contained a greater density of dots, fol-
lowed by confidence ratings in their choices. Participants were
rewarded according to the extent to which confidence ratings
tracked their objective performance over 60 trials and were
thus incentivized to report their confidence as accurately as
possible. Our measure of interest was metacognitive sensitivity
(meta-d0) [30], which quantifies subjects’ ability to discriminate
correct from incorrect decisions (see Figure 2C for the intuition
underpinning this measure). Metacognitive sensitivity is concep-
tually and empirically distinct from a bias toward reporting higher
or lower confidence [7].
In line with our hypothesis, higher values of dogmatic intoler-
ance were associated with reduced metacognitive sensitivity
(study 2: b = 0.12, p = 0.032, R2 = 0.01; see Figure 3A), in
the absence of any effect on perceptual discrimination perfor-
mance (study 2: b = 0.02, p = 0.77) and controlling for key demo-
graphic variables (i.e., age, gender, education). Importantly,
there was also no relation between dogmatism and overconfi-
dence (study 2: b = 0.07, p = 0.26), suggesting a specific reduc-
tion in the sensitivity with which confidence tracks performance,
rather than a bias in confidence. We replicated this reduction
of metacognitive sensitivity in dogmatic individuals in study 3
(b = 0.13, one-tailed p = 0.008, R2 = 0.014), again in the
absence of any observed link with perceptual performance
(b = 0.04, p = 0.60) or confidence bias (b = 0.07, p = 0.24). These
results show that more dogmatic people manifest a lowered
capacity to discriminate between their correct and incorrect
decisions, after controlling for differences in both primary task4016 Current Biology 28, 4014–4021, December 17, 2018performance and confidence bias. We obtained a qualitatively
similar pattern for authoritarianism (see Figure 3B), with trends
of reduced metacognitive sensitivity (study 2: b = 0.11, p =
0.051; study 3: b = 0.08, one-tailed p = 0.08), but no relation
with perceptual performance or confidence bias (all p values >
0.17). Across both facets of radicalism, this failure in metacog-
nition was driven by radicals holding unreasonably high confi-
dence in incorrect decisions compared to moderates (Figures
4B and S4).
In light of long-standing debates about whether the cognitive
profile of radicals is more similar to those on the left or right
sides of the political spectrum [5, 31], we also tested the rela-
tion between political orientation (rightward versus leftward)
and metacognition. Here, the pattern of results was qualita-
tively different, with no reduction of metacognitive sensitivity
(study 2: b = 0.08, p = 0.18; study 3: b = 0.02, p = 0.73)
in more conservative participants. In contrast, more conser-
vative participants showed an increased bias toward over-
confidence (study 2: b = 0.15, p = 0.035, R2 = 0.01; study 3:
b = 0.12, one-tailed p = 0.033, R2 = 0.008; see Figure 3C), as
found previously [32].
Metacognitive sensitivity is thought to be strongly linked to
an integration of evidence following a decision, allowing lati-
tude for the recognition and reversal of incorrect choices
[10, 11, 14]. Having demonstrated a specific decrease in
metacognitive sensitivity in more radical participants, we
next considered the same participants’ sensitivity to new
evidence. To specifically probe such post-decisional pro-
cessing, in a second phase of the experiment, we inserted
an additional sample of evidence (a new series of flickering
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Figure 3. ImpairedMetacognitiveSensitivity
and Reduced Disconfirmatory Evidence
Integration Predict Facets of Radicalism
(A–C) Multiple regression analyses predicting
factor scores (dogmatic intolerance, authoritari-
anism, and political orientation) from meta-
cognitive sensitivity and post-decision evidence
integration, controlling for multiple demographic
variables (gender, education, age) and other
task-related variables (e.g., performance in the
perceptual decision task). Perceptual perfor-
mance was averaged across tasks 1 and 2. We
present standardized beta coefficients ± SE of
predictors for study 2 (left markers, n = 381) and
study 3 (right markers, n = 417). (A) Dogmatic
intolerance was associated with impaired meta-
cognitive sensitivity and reduced disconfirmatory
evidence integration, in the absence of differ-
ences in overconfidence or performance. (B)
Authoritarianism showed qualitatively similar
patterns of association as dogmatism. (C) Politi-
cal orientation (higher values represent more
conservative views) was consistently associated
with a bias toward overconfidence but not
changes in metacognitive sensitivity or post-de-
cision evidence integration. Effects in study 3
were tested one-tailed based on the directional
hypothesis derived from study 2. yp < 0.1, *p <
0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Task 1, confidence
task; task 2, post-decision evidence integration
task.
See also Figures S3 and S4.dots) after subjects had committed to a choice but prior to
providing a confidence rating (task 2). Following correct
choices, additional evidence should normatively increase
participants’ confidence (due to integration of confirmatory
evidence; green markers in Figure 4B), whereas for incorrect
choices, additional evidence should lead to a decrease inCurrent Biologyconfidence (due to integration of dis-
confirmatory evidence; red markers in
Figure 4B).
In line with the proposal of a post-deci-
sional process supporting metacognition
[10], metacognitive sensitivity measured
in task 1 explained participants’ sensi-
tivity to post-decision evidence in task 2
(study 2: b = 0.1, p = 0.034; study 3: b =
0.18, one-tailed p < 0.0001). Furthermore,
and consistent with a tripartite relation-
ship between radicalism, metacognitive
sensitivity and post-decision evidence
integration, dogmatic intolerance was
associated with a specific reduction in
disconfirmatory evidence integration
(study 2: b = 0.15, p = 0.016, R2 =
0.015; study 3: b = 0.1, one-tailed p =
0.034, R2 = 0.008; see Figure 3A), repre-
senting a smaller decrease in confidence
on incorrect trials. Conversely, there was
no association between confirmatory
evidence integration on correct trials anddogmatism (study 2: b = 0.06, p = 0.37; study 3: b = 0.09, p =
0.13); i.e., more dogmatic people showed similar increases of
confidence on correct trials as that seen in moderates. We again
found a similar pattern of results in relation to authoritarianism
(seeFigure 3B)with decreaseddisconfirmatory evidence integra-
tion in study 2 (b = 0.19, p = 0.005, R2 = 0.019) and the same28, 4014–4021, December 17, 2018 4017
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Figure 4. Individual Differences in Radi-
calismAreCaptured by aChoice BiasModel
(A) A choice bias model fitted to the confidence
data across both tasks best accounted for varia-
tions in a composite measure of radicalism (sum-
med factor scores of dogmatic intolerance and
authoritarianism). We compared among three
computational models within multiple regressions
that predicted radicalism from fitted model pa-
rameters. We present the BIC of each regression
against the lowest BIC in the model set (the best
model has a difference in BIC of zero).
(B) Radicals reduce their confidence less when
new evidence indicates they are wrong (reduced
disconfirmatory evidence integration). To visualize
this effect, we combined data from study 2 and
study 3 and compared the 10% most radical
participants (based on the composite measure) against the rest of the sample. Aggregate confidence ratings are separated according to whether the decision
was correct (green) or incorrect (red). Markers (circles and squares) show raw data (group averages ±95%confidence interval) for each condition. Lines (solid line,
moderates; dashed line, radicals) show posterior predictives from the choice bias model. Predictions were simulated from best-fitting parameters and represent
group averages ±95% confidence interval. Task 1, confidence task; task 2, post-decision evidence integration task.
See also STAR Methods and Figures S3 and S4.trend in study 3 (b=0.09, one-tailed p=0.05, R2= 0.01), despite
no effect on confirmatory evidence integration (study 2: b =
0.04, p = 0.53; study 3: b = 0.09, p = 0.16). In contrast, while
higher conservatism was related to reduced disconfirmatory ev-
idence integration in study 2 (b=0.17, p = 0.012), this effect was
not replicated in study 3 (b = 0.02, one-tailed p = 0.33).
In light of associations among dogmatic intolerance, authori-
tarianism, and multiple behavioral measures of metacognitive
sensitivity, we next asked whether we could identify a core
computational driver of radicalism. We first combined the factor
scores of dogmatic intolerance and authoritarianism to
construct a composite measure of radicalism. As expected,
this combined measure showed similar relationships with meta-
cognition as the individual components (see Figure S3), with
impaired metacognitive sensitivity (study 2: b = 0.13, p =
0.0098, R2 = 0.018; study 3: b = 0.13, one-tailed p = 0.006,
R2 = 0.015) and reduced disconfirmatory evidence integration
(study 2: b = 0.21, p = 0.001, R2 = 0.027; study 3: b = 0.12,
one-tailed p = 0.015, R2 = 0.011). We next used this score to
identify putative mechanisms underpinning reduced metacogni-
tive sensitivity and disconfirmatory evidence integration in more
radical participants.
To this end, we compared alternative computational models of
how post-decision evidence affects confidence [11, 33] (see
STAR Methods for detailed descriptions of the models). All
models were grounded in signal detection theory, with two free
parameters (mlow and mhigh) representing internal evidence
strength for the weak and strong evidence conditions, respec-
tively. The models differed in how they updated their confidence
in light of new evidence. A ‘‘temporal weighting’’ model allows an
asymmetry in the overall weighting of pre- and post-decision ev-
idence; a ‘‘choice bias’’ model adds evidence for the chosen
response, without altering post-decision evidence integration;
and a ‘‘choice weighting’’ model incorporates asymmetric
weighting of confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence. We fit
the model simultaneously to data from the confidence task
(task 1, no post-decision evidence) and the post-decision evi-
dence task (task 2) and compared models based on how well4018 Current Biology 28, 4014–4021, December 17, 2018variability in fitted parameters captured individual differences
in radicalism in a linear regression.
The ‘‘choice bias’’ model best explained variations in radi-
calism (difference in Bayesian information criterion [BIC] relative
to next bestmodel: study 2 = 3.5 and study 3 = 3.3; see Figure 4A)
via a positive association with choice-dependent biases in con-
fidence (study 2: b = 0.14, p = 0.012; study 3: b = 0.18, one-tailed
p = 0.0005). This model accounts for a reduction in post-deci-
sional processing in more radical participants by boosting confi-
dence in chosen options, thereby making changes of mind less
likely (Figure 4B).
Taken together, our data show that key facets of radicalism
are associated with specific alterations in metacognitive abili-
ties. The finding that decision performance per se was not
associated with radicalism reveals that a specific change in in-
formation processing is manifest at a metacognitive, rather
than cognitive, level. Importantly, our results show that radi-
calism is associated with reductions in metacognitive sensi-
tivity, i.e., the reliability with which subjects distinguish between
their correct and incorrect beliefs. Thus, our findings comple-
ment and extend previous studies documenting alterations in
confidence in political radicals [3, 4, 6] but suggest that these
alterations may stem from changes in metacognitive sensitivity.
In contrast, for more right-wing subjects (as indexed by political
orientation), a change in confidence bias was observed.
Without the application of psychophysical measures of meta-
cognition, it has not, up until now, been possible to disentangle
these two factors.
What is striking is our demonstration that these impairments
are evident during performance of a low-level perceptual
discrimination task, where participants are unlikely to have
strong a priori vested interest in the outcome of their decisions,
ruling out multiple possible confounds (e.g., prior knowledge
and motivational factors). This contrasts with previous studies
that have investigated changes of mind about political attitudes
themselves, a context where there exists a strong motivation for
people to maintain their current beliefs in order to sustain a
positive (and consistent) self-image [15–18]. Thus, our results
suggest a potential explanation for why it is notoriously difficult to
change extreme beliefs by what would appear to be the simple
expediency of confronting people with evidence that contradicts
these beliefs. Before such information can update attitudes, the
manner in which a recipient processes this informationmay need
to be altered. We stress, however, that our results are entirely
compatible with a complementary role of motivational factors
as contributing to the maintenance of radical beliefs, and it is
possible that motivational factors may themselves interact with
metacognitive abilities.
Our modeling results suggest that a reduction in changes of
mind in radicals is driven by a boosting effect of choice, leading
participants to assign undue probability to the option they chose
without affecting the integration of post-decision evidence. This
computational mechanism shares notable similarities with clas-
sical findings in psychology in which the act of making a choice
itself affects subsequent preferences [34]. In contrast, recent
laboratory studies of post-decision evidence integration have
found that subjects’ behavior was best described either by a
near-optimal Bayesian model [11] or by diminished sensitivity
to post-decision evidence [33]. However, since both of these
studies investigated small samples of participants, variability
in radicalism of political and other beliefs was presumably
limited, where, for example, a majority of ‘‘moderates’’ would
obviate the need for a choice bias term. We stress that our
modeling approach aimed to find a model that best accounts
for individual differences in radicalism (while also fitting the
overall behavioral pattern). How to reconcile such individual dif-
ferences with a general model of post-decision evidence inte-
gration across different tasks remains a rich topic for future
investigation.
In our study, we investigated independent judgments wherein
participants integrate two consecutive samples of information.
This is distinct from more elaborate beliefs formed over longer
timescales, which require integration of multiple samples of in-
formation. A useful future extension of our work will be to
extrapolate our findings to situations where learning is required
over extended periods of time [35, 36]. Our computational
model fits indicate that more radical participants assign undue
probability to chosen options when updating their confidence,
which over repeated exposure to multiple samples of evidence
may summate, such that even small asymmetries in information
processing could lead to a highly skewed representation of re-
ality. In the current task, such resistance to updating is detri-
mental, leading to a loss of earnings (Figure S3). However, in
other scenarios, such as if there were reason to distrust the
fidelity of the new information, a reduction in belief flexibility
may prove adaptive. Such considerations remain to be explored
in future studies and point to the intriguing notion that metacog-
nitive flexibility may itself be amenable to strategic or environ-
mental influences.
We used perceptual decision-making as a model system that
permitted precise control over performance so as to reveal
relationships between radicalism and metacognition. A question
remains as to whether the metacognitive alterations shown
here would extend to other types of decision (e.g., value-based,
memory-based). Recent evidence points toward a core domain-
general circuit supporting metacognitive abilities [37, 38], sug-
gesting that metacognition as measured in the current taskmay represent an indicator of a more general metacognitive
ability. Despite relatively small effect sizes, our findings linking
radicalism to changes in metacognition are robust and repli-
cable across two independent samples. However, we note
that other, domain-specific facets of metacognition (e.g., insight
into the validity of higher-level reasoning or certainty about
value-based choices [39]) are arguably closer to the drivers of
radicalization of political and religious beliefs, suggesting that
the current results represent a lower bound for the strength of
a relationship between metacognitive abilities and radicalism.
Similarly, while our measures of radicalism were derived from
questionnaires tapping into political attitudes, it is possible
that impairments in metacognition may constitute a general
feature of radicalism about political, religious, and scientific
issues.
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EXPERIMENTAL MODEL AND SUBJECT DETAILS
All three studies were conducted online and recruited subjects from the US via the online labor market AmazonMechanical Turk [40].
Mechanical Turk has been shown to be more representative of the population than typical college student samples [41, 42], and pro-
duces high quality data [40] with good internal and external validity [43, 44], even when using complex behavioral tasks [45]. All data
were collected in the year 2017. Subjects gave informed consent and the study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of
University College London (#1260-003).
In Study 1 subjects completed questionnaires about political issues [4, 19–22]. In Studies 2 and 3, participants filled out the same
questionnaires as in Study 1 and additionally completed two perceptual decision-making tasks (a confidence task and a post-deci-
sion evidence integration task; see below). In Study 3, we additionally included the Zung self-rating depression scale and a question
about self-esteem; these data will be reported elsewhere.
In Study 1we analyzed data from 344 subjects (46%women,mean age 34.9 years, range 19-73 years; see Figure S1A left panel). In
Study 2 a sample of 381 subjects were included for analysis of questionnaires and behavioral tasks (51.4% women, mean age
36.0 years, range 19-70 years; see Figure S1A middle panel). In Study 3 a sample of 417 subjects was included for analysis of
questionnaires and behavioral tasks (47%women, mean age 35.8 years, range 18-71 years; see Figure S1A right panel). The sample
size of Study 3 (n = 417) was defined by an a priori power analysis based on effect sizes from Study 2 for associations between radi-
calism and meta-d’ (power = 77%) or disconfirmatory evidence integration (power = 89%). All studies recruited participants with a
diverse education level (see Figure S1B), which is generally comparable to the US population [46].
Self-reported political orientation (‘‘very liberal’’ = 0 to ‘‘very conservative’’ = 100) in both samples was somewhat skewed to the
liberal end of the spectrum (Study 1: mean = 38.1; Study 2: mean = 38.0; Study 3: mean = 41.9) which is in line with previous reports of
Amazon Mechanical Turk workers being more liberal than the general US population [41]. However, there remained substantial
variability in political orientation as measured via factor analysis.
METHOD DETAILS
Experimental design
Stimuli
Perceptual discrimination experiments were programmed in JavaScript using JsPsych (version 5.0.3) and hosted on the online
research platform Gorilla (https://gorilla.sc/). The experiment was accessed via a web browser and participants were required to
use full-screen mode to complete the task. Stimuli consisted of two black squares (each 250 3 250 pixels) centrally positioned
on the screen, one square to the left and the other square to the right of center. These squares were subdivided into grids of 625
cells, randomly filled with white dots. One square always contained 313 cells filled with dots and the other square contained a greatere1 Current Biology 28, 4014–4021.e1–e8, December 17, 2018
number of filled cells (the exact number of additional dots was adjusted for each individual using a staircase procedure). The differ-
ence in dot number between the two squares determined the judgment difficulty. Five such configurations were presented per trial,
each for 150ms, creating the impression of flickering dots. The exact location of dots per configuration was random, but within one
trial, the difference in number of dots and also the side which contained more dots remained constant.
Task and procedure
For Studies 2 and 3, the experiment lasted around 1 hour. After receiving general information and instructions, participants began the
behavioral experiment which was divided into 3 parts. First, participants completed 120 trials of a calibration phase (which was used
to individually adjust the task difficulty, see below), in which they performed the perceptual judgement by reporting whether the left or
the right square containedmore dots. Second, there were 60 trials of the same perceptual judgement followed by a confidence rating
(‘‘confidence task,’’ Task 1; Figure 2A). Finally, there were 120 trials of a ‘‘post-decision evidence integration task’’ (Task 2; Figure 2B),
in which subjects performed the perceptual judgement, received additional post-decision evidence and then rated their confidence.
After completing the behavioral tasks, participants filled out questionnaires regarding their political orientation and radicalism.
Calibration phase
Before performing the main task, each participant performed a calibration phase comprising 120 trials judging whether the left or the
right square contained more dots without confidence ratings, using their computer keyboard (using the ‘‘W’’ and ‘‘E’’ keys to indicate
left and right, respectively). Responses were unspeeded and possible only after stimulus offset. During the calibration phase (but not
the experimental phase), visual feedback was delivered to indicate whether the judgment was correct (a green frame around the
chosen square) or incorrect (a red frame around the chosen square). The calibration phase was used to find a stimulus strength
(dot difference between left and right) for each participant that elicited approximately 71% correct performance (actual performance:
mean = 73.2%, sd = 6.3%) in the discrimination task using a 2-down-1-up staircase procedure [47] operating on the logarithm of dot
difference. Participants completed 70 trials of the staircase and the average of the last 25 trials was stored and used as the individual
stimulus strength throughout the rest of the experiment. For the post-decision evidence integration task we also presented stronger
evidence than the staircased stimulus strength on a subset of trials. This stronger level of evidence was generated by multiplying the
logarithm of the staircased dot difference by a factor of 1.3. To quantify the performance level induced by this stimulus strength for
each individual, participants performed 50 additional perceptual judgements at this higher stimulus strength interleaved with the
staircased trials (after 20 initial ‘‘burn-in’’ trials to allow the staircase to converge) and yoked to the current staircase value. In the
group as a whole, the higher evidence strength evoked a mean performance level of 81.0% correct (sd = 3.8%).
Confidence task (Task 1)
The confidence task comprised a total of 60 trials, all at the same (lower) stimulus strength determined in the calibration phase. On
each trial, participants judged which side contained more dots, before rating confidence in their decision (a detailed trial timeline is
displayed in Figure 2A). Participants were instructed to report their confidence as a subjective probability that their decision was
correct, rated on a 9-point sliding scale. The scalemidpoint was labeled with 50%, the lowest category with 0% and the highest cate-
gory with 100%. Confidence ratings were incentivized using the quadratic scoring rule [48]. This scoring rule provides maximal
reward both when one is maximally confident and right, and minimally confident and wrong.
Post-decision evidence integration task (Task 2)
The post-decision evidence integration task consisted of 120 trials, split into 60 trials with low post-decision evidence strength and 60
trials with high post-decision evidence strength, pseudo-randomly interleaved. Within each trial, participants first judged which side
contained more dots as described under ‘‘Confidence task’’ above. After this initial decision, they received additional evidence. The
location of higher dot density in the post-decision evidence presentation was always of the same (correct) sign as the pre-decision
evidence presentation, but of variable strength. Subjects were instructed that this evidence was ‘‘bonus’’ information that could be
used to inform their confidence in their initial response. The post-decision evidence could either have the same strength as the
pre-decision evidence (low post-decision evidence) or have a higher evidence strength (high post-decision evidence). After the
presentation of post-decision evidence, participants were asked to indicate their confidence in their initial decision.
Data quality and exclusion criteria
In Study 1 we analyzed questionnaire data from 344 subjects. Six subjects were excluded from the original sample (n = 350) because
they failed to answer correctly at least one of two catch questions interspersed within the questionnaires (‘‘If you have read this ques-
tion please choose Agree Completely’’ and ‘‘Please choose Disagree completely if you read this question’’).
In Study 2 a sample of 381 subjects were included for analysis of questionnaires and behavioral tasks. To ensure data quality we
excluded 123 subjects (original sample n = 504) based on a range of pre-defined exclusion criteria. First, 5 subjects were excluded
from questionnaire analysis due to answering at least one of the two catch questions incorrectly, as described above. An additional
77 subjects were excluded due to performance in the perceptual decision-task being above 85% or below 60% correct, indicating
that the staircase procedure was insufficient to produce threshold performance. Five subjects were excluded because they chose a
single confidence ratingmore than 90%of the time and an additional 10 subjects were excluded due tomedian confidence response
times of below 850 ms, indicating that they rated their confidence very quickly and possibly without care (see Figure S2A left panel).
Finally, 26 subjects were excluded due to a large proportion of missed trials (> 5%).
In Study 3 a sample of 417 subjects was included for analysis of questionnaires and behavioral tasks. As in Study 2, we excluded
158 subjects (original sample n = 575) based on the same pre-defined exclusion criteria. Seventeen subjects were excluded from
questionnaire analysis due to answering at least one of the two catch questions incorrectly. An additional 90 subjects were excludedCurrent Biology 28, 4014–4021.e1–e8, December 17, 2018 e2
due to performance in the perceptual decision task being above 85% or below 60%, indicating that the staircase procedure was
insufficient to produce threshold performance. 11 subjects were excluded because they chose a single confidence rating more
than 90% of the time, and an additional 19 subjects were excluded for median confidence reaction times below 850 ms (see
Figure S2A right panel). Finally, 21 subjects were excluded due to a significant proportion of missed trials (> 5%).
Exclusion criteria followed similar procedures used in our lab [9] and elsewhere [49]. The overall exclusion rate (25%) was similar
to other studies from our lab and is consistent with a recent meta-analysis which found that between 3% and 37% of the sample is
typically excluded in web-based experiments [50].
We applied these exclusion criteria to ensure high-quality data and prevent our results being influenced by people performing the
task without care. However, we also established that results were qualitatively similar in the absence of exclusions, with our com-
posite measure of radicalism remaining associated with impaired metacognitive sensitivity (Study 2: b = 0.13, p = 0.008; Study 3:
b =0.12, p = 0.01) and reduced disconfirmatory evidence integration (Study 2: b =0.22, p = 0.0002; Study 3: b =0.14, p = 0.009).
Behavioral analysis
Measurement of metacognitive ability
For assessment of metacognitive ability we calculated meta-d’ [30], a signal detection theoretic measure of metacognitive sensitivity
that is uncorrupted by the tendency to report high or low confidence (overconfidence bias [7]). To estimate meta-d’ we employed a
Bayesian estimation scheme [51] (HMeta-d; https://github.com/metacoglab/HMeta-d), using the non-hierarchical version of the
model.
Measurement of post-decision evidence integration
Wemeasured confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence integration as changes in confidence induced by post-decision evidence.
We constructed trial-by-trial linear models for every participant, separately for correct and incorrect trials across data pooled across
Tasks 1 and 2, using post-decision evidence strength as a predictor (confidence task = 0, low post-decision evidence = 1, high
post-decision evidence = 2) and confidence ratings as the dependent variable. Individual beta weights for correct trials, indicating
increases of confidence due to post-decision evidence, were estimated as measures of confirmatory evidence integration. Discon-
firmatory evidence integration was estimated as the beta weight on incorrect trials (we reversed the sign of this beta weight in the
figures such that higher values indicate greater disconfirmatory evidence integration).
We additionally tested whether sensitivity to post-decision evidence could be predicted from metacognitive sensitivity measured
in Task 1. For this purpose, we calculated sensitivity to post-decision evidence based solely on trials from Task 2 to ensure
independence from estimation of metacognitive ability in Task 1. For each subject we constructed a trial-by-trial linear model with
confidence as dependent variable, entering the following predictors: accuracy (correct = 1 and incorrect = 1), post-decision
evidence strength (low post-decision evidence = 1 and high post-decision evidence = 2) and the critical accuracy 3 post-decision
evidence strength interaction. This interaction term quantifies the extent to which confidence increases on correct trials and
decreases on error trials at higher levels of post-decision evidence strength, thus forming a summary measure of sensitivity to addi-
tional evidence.
Factor analysis
There is extant debate about the underlying structure of political ideology and its relation to radical beliefs [52]. Therefore, instead of
relying on direct self-report measures of political orientation and radicalism, we combined multiple questionnaires related to political
orientation, intolerance, dogmatism and authoritarianism, and conducted a factor analysis to identify the most parsimonious factor
structure.
Regarding political orientation, we included questions that reflect putatively separate facets of social and economic conservatism
[52]. Participants filled out questions about the following issues: political orientation on a ‘‘liberal-conservative’’ dimension (general
conservatism and separately for social and economic issues), voting behavior and identification with the U.S. Democratic or Repub-
lican party, a social and economic conservatism scale [19], and attitudes toward specific political issues [4].
To measure dogmatism we employed a widely used scale that assays this construct [22]. Additionally, we administered previously
used questions [4] about belief superiority and intolerance of opposing political opinions as these are known to show considerable
conceptual overlap with dogmatism and have previously been reported as manifesting a quadratic relationship with political orien-
tation [4].
Authoritarianism is widely conceptualized as prevalent on the right side of the political spectrum together with more controversial
proposals of a similar trait in left-wing individuals [5, 21]. Left-wing authoritarianismmay be rarely reported due to problemswithmea-
surement (right-wing authoritarianism scales are not content-free but target conservative tendencies) or sample characteristics. To
counteract such concerns here we included both left-wing [21] and right-wing [20] authoritarianism scales.
An exploratory factor analysis was conducted on all 78 single questionnaire items using maximum likelihood estimation. Factor
analysis was conducted using the fa() function from the Psych package in R, with an oblique rotation (oblimin). The number of factors
was extracted based on the Cattell-Nelson-Gorsuch [53] test using the nFactors package in R. The Cattell-Nelson-Gorsuch test
revealed a three-factor solution as the best and most parsimonious solution for the covariance structure of the single items (see
Figure 1A and Figure S1C for the factor loadings of individual items). The pattern of factor loadings was qualitatively similar for
both Study 1 (Figure 1A) and the combined data from all three Studies (Figure S2C). To obtain precise estimates of factor loadingse3 Current Biology 28, 4014–4021.e1–e8, December 17, 2018
and thus more reliable factor scores we conducted the factor analysis on the pooled sample from all three studies when extracting
factor scores for use in analysis of behavioral data in Studies 2 and 3.
The first factor tracked political orientation (liberal to conservative) as indicated by the highest loading item Please rate your overall
political attitude on the dimension from ‘‘liberal’’ to ‘‘conservative’’ (factor loading = 0.90). The second factor loaded predominantly on
the dogmatism and intolerance questionnaires, with the highest loading items concerning rigid and dogmatic world views, e.g.,My
opinions are right and will stand the test of time (factor loading = 0.73) and intolerance of opposing political beliefs, e.g., My beliefs
about the government’s role in helping people in need are totally correct (mine is the only correct view) (factor loading = 0.58). The third
factor was related to authoritarianism and showed the highest loadings on questions related to obedience to in-group authorities,
e.g., A revolutionary movement is justified in demanding obedience and conformity of its members (factor loading = 0.43), group con-
ventions, e.g., The withdrawal from tradition will turn out to be a fatal fault one day (factor loading = 0.37) and support of aggression to
reach one’s political goals, e.g.,What our country really needs is a strong, determined Chancellor which will crush the evil and set us
on our right way again (factor loading = 0.40). Although we labeled these three factors based on both theoretical considerations and
their respective patterns of item loadings, we acknowledge that this is an inherently subjective process and that alternative labels are
possible. However we stress that the identification of the factors, and their interrelationships, was entirely data driven and was repli-
cated across all three experiments. We note that this pattern of factor loadings is consistent with a one-dimensional model of political
orientation (in contrast to separate factors for social and economic conservatism).
Computational modeling
All computational models were adapted from those developed by Fleming et al. [11] in a study of post-decision evidence integration
during random-dot kinematogram decisions. We examined the potential of these models to explain individual differences in meta-
cognitive sensitivity and confidence updating based on post-decision evidence observed in relation to radicalism. All models were
grounded in signal detection theory, and simultaneously modeled choices and confidence ratings of Tasks 1 and 2. In the confidence
task, subjects receive one internal sample, Xpre generated from pre-decision evidence, whereas for the post-decision evidence
integration task subjects receive two internal samples, Xpre from pre-decision evidence and Xpost from post-decision evidence. These
samples in turn were generated from a Gaussian whose sign depended on the location of objectively higher dot density (left = 1,
right = 1) and mean on internal evidence strength qpre or qpost:
Xpre  Nðdqpre;1ÞXpost  Nðdqpost; 1Þ
The internal evidence strength depended on the dot difference and was always the same for qpre (mlow), whereas the evidence
strength could be either low or high for qpost ˛ [mlow mlhigh], where mlow and mhigh are free parameters. The likelihood of Xpre or Xpost
was approximated by a Gaussian with mean m and variance s2. For the confidence task (Task 1) in which only Xpre was presented,
we set m = qpre and s
2 = 1. For the post-decision evidence task (Task 2), we approximated the likelihood of both Xpre and Xpost as a
single Gaussian with mean m and variance s2 determined by a mixture of Gaussians across the two possible evidence strengths.
Starting with Xpost :
PðXpost
d = 1Þ=X
qpost
pðqpostÞNðqpost; 1Þ
As each of the two evidence strengths is equally likely by design ðpðqpostÞ= 0:5Þ we can define the mean as:
m=
P
qpost
2
The aggregate variance s2 can be decomposed into both between- and within condition variance. From the law of total variance:
s2 =
X
qpost
pðqpostÞ½E½Xpost
 qpost  m2 +X
qpost
pðqpostÞVarðXpost
 qpostÞs2 =
X
qpost
pðqpostÞ½E½Xpost
 qpost  m2 + 1
We assume that subjects are agnostic about the set of evidence strengths presented before and after the decision, such that
m and s2 are the same for both Xpre and Xpost.
In both tasks, actions a are made by comparing Xpre to a criterion parameter m that accommodates any stimulus-independent
biases toward the leftward or rightward response, a = Xpre > m. Each piece of evidence, Xpre and Xpost, updates the log posterior
odds of the rightward location containing a higher dot density, LOdir, which under flat priors is equal to the log likelihood:
LOpredir = log
Pðd = 1 jXpreÞ
Pðd =  1 jXpreÞ= log
PðXpre
d = 1Þ
PðXpre
d =  1Þ
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LOpostdir = log
Pðd = 1 jXpostÞ
Pðd =  1 jXpostÞ= log
PðXpost
d = 1Þ
PðXpost
d =  1Þ
where, due to the Gaussian generative model for X, LOdir is equal to:
LOdir = log
eðm+XÞ
2=2s2
eðmXÞ
2=2s2
Positive values indicate greater belief in the higher dot density being on the right; negative values indicate greater belief in higher
density on the left. To update confidence in one’s choice, the belief in dot density (LOdir) is transformed into a belief about decision
accuracy (LOcorrect) conditional on the chosen action:
If a = 1:
LOcorrect = LOdir
Otherwise:
LOcorrect =  LOdir
As for LOdir, LOcorrect in the post-decision evidence task can be decomposed into pre- and post-decisional parts:
LOtotalcorrect = LO
pre
correct + LO
post
correct
For trials of the confidence task, LOpostcorrect was set to zero for all models as in those trials no post-decision evidence was presented.
The final log odds correct is then transformed to a probability to generate a confidence rating on a 0-1 scale:
Confidence=
1
1+ exp

 LOtotalcorrect

Model extensions accounting for differences in post-decision evidence integration
We considered different mechanisms that could account for reduced metacognitive sensitivity and changes of mind in radicals,
adapted from Fleming et. al. [11] and Bronfman et al. [33].
Temporal weighting: We considered participants may apply differential weighting to pre- and post-decision evidence when
computing confidence. The ‘‘temporal weighting’’ model captured such differences via two free parameters (wpre and wpost) as
follows:
LOtotalcorrect =wpre  LOprecorrect +wpost  LOpostcorrect
Choice weighting: An alternative model applies differential weighting to post-decision evidence depending on whether this evi-
dence is in support of the chosen option (confirmatory) or unchosen option (disconfirmatory). To capture this effect we introduced
two separate weighting parameters based on the correspondence between the decision and post-decision evidence:
If sign(Xpost) = sign(a):
LOtotalcorrect = LO
pre
correct +wconfirmatory  LOpostcorrect
Otherwise:
LOtotalcorrect = LO
pre
correct +wdisconfirmatory  LOpostcorrect
Choice bias: Finally we considered a model in which subjects become more confident in the option they chose, irrespective of the
strength of post-decision evidence. This was implemented by adding a fixed amount of subjective probability to the chosen option
which was controlled by a free parameter wbias:
If a = 1:
LObias = log

wbias
1wbias

Otherwise:
LObias = log

1wbias
wbias
LOtotaldir = LO
pre
dir + LO
post
dir + LObiase5 Current Biology 28, 4014–4021.e1–e8, December 17, 2018
If a = 1:
LOtotalcorrect = LO
total
dir
Otherwise:
LOtotalcorrect =  LOtotaldir
Note that the choice bias term (unlike the weighting parameters in alternative model extensions) also affects the predictions for the
confidence task as it is applied independently of the level of post-decision evidence.
Model fitting
We used variational Bayesian inference implemented in STAN [54] to approximate draws from the posterior distribution of parame-
ters given theworld state d, subjects’ choices a and their confidence ratings r. Sincewe had relatively few trials per subject, we used a
hierarchical fitting procedure.We set themaximum number of iterations to 150,000 and a convergence tolerance on the relative norm
of the objective to 0.0001 (this is a conservative approach regarding convergence; default options in STAN are 10,000 iterations and a
convergence tolerance of 0.01). From the approximate posterior, 1000 samples were drawn for each of the following parameters
(where indicates ‘‘ is distributed as,’’ N represents a normal distribution, HN indicates a positive half-normal distribution, and j in-
dexes each subject):
Group-level parameters:
mm  Nð0;1Þsm  HNð0; 10Þsreport  HNð0; 0:1Þ
If Temporal weighting model:
mwpre  Nð1; 1Þswpre  HNð0; 10Þmwpost  Nð1;1Þswpost  HNð0;10Þ
If Choice weighting model:
mwconfirm  Nð1; 1Þswconfirm  HNð0; 10Þmwdisconfirm  Nð1;1Þswdisconfirm  HNð0;10Þ
If Choice bias model:
mwbias  Nð:5; 1Þswbias  HNð0;10Þ
Subject-level parameters:
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mlow;j  N
 
d
0
low;j
2
;1
!mhigh;j  N
 
d
0
high;j
2
;1
!qpre =mlow;j qpost =

mlow;j;mhigh;j

If Temporal weighting model:
wpre;j  N
	
mwpre;swpre

wpost;j  N
	
mwpost;swpost


If Choice weighting model:
wconfirm;j  Nðmwconfirm;swconfirmÞwdisconfirm;j  Nðmwdisconfirm;swdisconfirmÞ
If Choice bias model:
wbias;j  Nðmwbias;swbiasÞ
Model:
Xpre  Nðdqpre; 1ÞXpost  Nðdqpost;1Þa  Bernoulli logitð1000  ðXpre mjÞÞr  Nðconf ;sreportÞ
where ‘‘conf’’ is the output of the confidence computation detailed above. The logit function implements a steep softmax relating Xpre
to a, and is applied for computational stability. The mapping between model confidence and observed confidence allowed a small
degree of imprecision in the subjects’ ratings via a free parameter sreport which was fitted at the group level. Note that the internal
evidence strengths for the low and high evidence conditions were not fitted hierarchically, but were constrained by subjects’
observed d’ values.
Model comparison
To compare between alternative models we assessed their ability to capture individual differences in radicalism. To this end, we
constructed separate multiple regressions to predict radicalism scores from the mean of the posterior draws of each model’s fitted
parameters. For each model we inputted mlow,j and mhigh,j as predictors together with model-specific parameters (choice bias (wbias),
weighting parameters for confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence (wconfirmatory andwdisconfirmatory) or weighting parameters for pre
and post-decision evidence (wpre and wpost)). We computed BIC scores for each multiple regression to identify model fits that best
explained individual difference in radicalism. Note that this model comparison approach differs from standard approaches in that it is
concerned with best capturing individual differences rather than an aggregate fit to the group.
Since the BIC score includes a penalty for model complexity (i.e., number of parameters), we wished to ensure that the choice bias
model was not favored due to its lower complexity alone. We therefore also consideredmultiple regressions that included only one of
the fitted parameters from the more complex temporal weighting and choice weighting models (wdisconfirmatory orwconfirmatory;wpre or
wpost) as predictors and included these variants in the model comparison. The parameter combinations with the lowest BIC scores
are presented in Figure 4A.e7 Current Biology 28, 4014–4021.e1–e8, December 17, 2018
Model simulations
To visualize qualitative features of computational model fits and determine their ability to account for the patterns of confidence
ratings in moderates and radicals (a posterior predictive check, see Figure 4B), we drew 100 samples from the posterior distributions
of fitted parameters for each participant, and for each draw simulated 4000 trials per subject per condition (confidence task, low and
high post-decision evidence) with these parameter settings.
QUANTIFICATION AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
In all regression analyses we employed robust fits by using the default robust option of the MATLAB function fitlm which applies a
‘‘bisquare’’ weighting. We checked for multicollinearity of all multiple regressions by calculating the variance inflation factor for each
predictor, which was < 2 for all regressions and predictors and below a standard cut-off value of 10 [55]. R2-values for each predictor
were calculated by comparing the explained variance of the full model including this predictor to a model excluding the predictor of
interest. All effects for Studies 1 and 2 were tested two-tailed. Since we had strong a priori hypotheses in the replication sample,
effects in Study 3 were tested one-tailed based on the directional hypothesis derived from Study 2.
The following regression analyses were conducted:
1. To investigate the relation between political orientation, dogmatic intolerance and authoritarianism, we specified separate
models with dogmatic intolerance and authoritarianism as dependent variables and political orientation as a predictor in a
second-order polynomial regression, with both linear and quadratic terms for the predictor. The relationship of political
orientation with dogmatic intolerance and authoritarianism was labeled as linear or quadratic via comparison of BIC scores
of models with either or both terms.
2. To quantify the link between metacognitive sensitivity (measured in the confidence task) and sensitivity to post-decision
evidence we conducted a multiple regression analysis with post-decision evidence sensitivity as the dependent variable
and separate predictors for meta-d’ in Task 1, perceptual task performance (d’) averaged across Tasks 1 and 2, confidence
bias in Task 1, objective evidence strength (logarithm of dot difference) and performance at higher post-decision evidence
strength (as measured in the calibration phase).
3. To investigate the relation between metacognitive function and radicalism we implemented separate multiple regression
models with the factor scores (dogmatic intolerance, authoritarianism and political orientation) as dependent variables and
separate predictors for meta-d’ in Task 1, confidence bias in Task 1, confirmatory evidence integration in Task 2, disconfirma-
tory evidence integration in Task 2, perceptual task performance (d’) averaged across Tasks 1 and 2, objective stimulus
strength (logarithm of dot difference), performance at the higher post-decision evidence strength (as measured in the calibra-
tion phase), age, gender and education.
4. Finally, to investigate whether radicalism was associated with reduced earnings in the task, we constructed a multiple regres-
sion model with earnings as dependent variable and radicalism as predictor, controlling for perceptual task performance (d’)
averaged across Tasks 1 and 2 and objective stimulus strength (logarithm of dot difference).DATA AND SOFTWARE AVAILABILITY
Fully anonymised data are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request. Code for data analysis and computational
model fits are available from a dedicated Github repository (https://github.com/metacoglab/RollwageDolanFleming).Current Biology 28, 4014–4021.e1–e8, December 17, 2018 e8
